An Honest Services Debate by Beale, Sara Sun
251 
An Honest Services Debate 
 
 
Sara Sun Beale* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern federal prosecutors found a wide variety of innovative uses for the 
mail fraud statute,
1
 and by the middle of the Twentieth Century it had become a 
major weapon in the government‘s arsenal.  When he was a federal prosecutor, 
Judge Jed Rakoff called the mail fraud statute the ―true love‖ of white collar 
prosecutors because of ―its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity.‖2  
This affection for the mail fraud act has not been universally shared.  Indeed in two 
cases, one in 1987 and the other in 2010, the Supreme Court has made clear its 
discomfort with the adaptability that has made the mail fraud statute so valuable to 
prosecutors.  In the first decision, McNally v. United States, a majority of the Court 
gave the statute a narrowing interpretation and held that if Congress wished the 
statute to sweep more broadly, ―it must speak more clearly than it has.‖3  Congress 
did speak more clearly.  Within a year it put federal prosecutors back in business, 
overriding McNally with the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which extends the 
mail fraud statute to schemes to ―deprive another of the intangible right of honest 
services.‖4   
In 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in three cases presenting 
questions concerning the ―honest services‖ provision.  Weyhrauch v. United States5 
was a Ninth Circuit case in which an Alaska state legislator had been charged with 
violating his duty of honest services by failing to disclose a conflict of interest.
6
  
The Court granted certiorari to decide whether a violation of state law is a requisite 
element of an honest services violation under § 1346.  Black v. United States was a 
private sector fraud case from the Seventh Circuit involving newspaper magnate 
Conrad Black.
 7
  The question in Black was whether § 1346 requires proof that the 
                                                                                                                                                   
*   Charles L.B. Lowndes Professor, Duke Law School.  I would like to thank Bryan Leitch 
and James Gillenwater, Duke Law ‘12, for their outstanding assistance with the research for and 
editing of this essay.  Also, thanks to Sam Buell, Lisa Griffin, Susan Klein, Neil Siegel, Erin Blondel, 
and the participants in Duke‘s faculty workshop for many helpful comments.  All errors are my own. 
1   See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).  Although for simplicity‘s sake I refer only to mail fraud, this 
discussion also encompasses the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which parallels its older sibling 
in virtually all respects. 
2   Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980). 
3   McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). 
4   See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). 
5   130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (per curiam).  
6   United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008). 
7   130 S. Ct. 2963, 2966−67 (2010). 
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defendant‘s fraudulent scheme contemplated economic harm to the party to whom 
the duty of honest services was owed.
8
  In Skilling v. United States, a Fifth Circuit 
case, former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling‘s petition raised two questions 
concerning § 1346: (1) whether the statute requires intent to obtain private gain 
from the party to whom honest services are owed; and (2) if not, whether § 1346 is 
void for vagueness.
9 
 
The Court issued only one opinion on the merits, in Skilling.  It concluded that 
in enacting § 1346 Congress had (once again) not spoken clearly enough.  In an 
opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, six members of the Court rejected the 
vagueness claim but construed the statute to be limited to bribes and kickbacks, 
which it found had comprised the ―vast majority‖ and ―lion‘s share‖ of the honest 
services prosecutions.
10
  The Court did not resolve–or even discuss–whether a state 
law violation, economic harm, and/or private gain were necessary elements 
(though bribery and kickbacks by their nature involve gain to the defendant).  
Justice Scalia (writing for himself and two other justices) wrote separately to argue 
that § 1346 was unconstitutionally vague.
11
  Weyhrauch and Black were vacated 
and remanded in light of the decision in Skilling.
12
 
I have chosen to use a fictional debate to explore the issues raised by § 1346 
and the Supreme Court‘s opinion in Skilling.  The debate takes place when two 
faculty colleagues who always enjoy a good argument meet in the faculty lounge 
to discuss the cases from the Supreme Court‘s most recent term. 
 
II. THE DEBATE 
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: I like the decision in Skilling.  It‘s a good practical 
solution to the problems created by Congress‘s abysmally bad drafting of § 1346.  
Congress provided no definition of ―the intangible right to honest services,‖ and 
frankly nobody knew what it meant.  We should be grateful that the Court cleaned 
up the mess Congress made without invalidating the law.  It‘s much better to limit 
federal prosecutions to bribery and kickbacks, rather than some broader and more 
amorphous standard.   
I don‘t think Congress had any idea of the problems its broad language 
created.  That‘s probably why the Skilling Court added a footnote detailing some of 
the many issues Congress would have to resolve if it wants to pass legislation 
                                                                                                                                                   
8   Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010) (No. 08-
876). 
9   Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (No. 
08-1394). 
10  130 S. Ct. 2896, 2930, 2931−32 n.44 (citations omitted). 
11  See id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
12  Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 
2966, 2970 (2010). 
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criminalizing other conduct.
13
  Congress was clueless when it wrote § 1346, and 
the Court was right to worry that Congress might make the same mistakes again. 
 
PROF. KRYTIC: As a matter of judicial interpretation, the Skilling opinion—and 
your defense of it—is problematic on so many levels it‘s hard to know where to 
begin.  For starters, the Court‘s interpretation of § 1346 came out of the blue.  As 
Justice Scalia correctly noted, no court had previously held that honest services 
mail fraud is limited to bribery and kickbacks,
14
 though admittedly Jeffrey 
Skilling‘s brief and some academics had proposed such limitations.15  
How do you get there as a matter of statutory interpretation?  You can‘t just 
decide what you think is good policy.  Statutory interpretation should start with the 
text but also take account of the legislative history.  Interestingly, Skilling gives us 
hardly any textual analysis (a point which even Justice Scalia ignores), and only a 
few opinions in the lower courts took the language of the statute seriously.  Judges 
Reena Raggi and Patrick Higginbotham were noteworthy exceptions.
16
 
But most courts have started more or less where Justice Ginsburg did: with 
the fact that Congress enacted § 1346 to override McNally.  As she wrote (lifting a 
line from the Second Circuit), when § 1346 refers to ―the‖ right to honest services, 
it was referring to that right as defined in the pre-McNally case law.
17
 
                                                                                                                                                   
13  Footnote 45 of the Skilling opinion states: 
If Congress were to take up the enterprise of criminalizing undisclosed self-dealing by a 
public official or private employee . . .  it would have to employ standards of sufficient 
definiteness and specificity to overcome due process concerns.  The Government[‗s] 
propose[d] [] standard that prohibits the taking of official action by the employee that 
furthers his own undisclosed financial interests while purporting to act in the interests of 
those to whom he owes a fiduciary duty . . . leaves many questions unanswered. How 
direct or significant does the conflicting financial interest have to be? To what extent 
does the official action have to further that interest in order to amount to fraud? To whom 
should the disclosure be made and what information should it convey? These questions 
and others call for particular care in attempting to formulate an adequate criminal 
prohibition in this context.  
Id. at 2933 n.45 (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
14  Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2939 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
15  Brief for the Petitioner at 48–52, Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (No. 08-
1394) (arguing that § 1346 ―Should Be Limited To Acts Taken For Private Gain In The Form Of 
Bribes Or Kickbacks‖ and should not ―encompass the ambiguous, outlier category of ‗self dealing‘ 
cases.‖).  Also, Professor Albert Alschuler filed an influential brief in Weyhrauch making the same 
argument.  See Brief of Albert W. Alschuler as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 28−32, 
Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1196).  See also Sara Sun Beale, 
Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government’s Authority to Prosecute Federal Corruption and 
State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising Conclusions and a Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 
718‒21 (2000) (arguing that state and local officials should not be subject to more stringent federal 
standards than federal officials and § 1346 should be construed in accordance with the carefully 
drawn limitations in 18 U.S.C. § 1346). 
16  See United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2003) (Raggi, J., concurring in 
the judgment); United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 731–32, 734–35 (5th Cir. 1997). 
17  See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928‒29. 
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So far, so good.  But as Justice Ginsburg acknowledged, before McNally there 
were honest services prosecutions that rested on self-dealing and the failure to 
disclose conflicts, not bribery or kickbacks.  The Justice Department brief listed 
thirteen of them from a variety of circuits.
18
  Those cases were an important part of 
the honest services doctrine that Congress reenacted in § 1346. 
The Supreme Court knew what Congress intended, but it refused to interpret 
the statute in conformity with that intent.  Why?  The Court didn‘t like the breadth 
of honest services, so it rewrote the statute.  Justice Scalia was right to call this 
―invention‖ rather than ―interpretation.‖19 
Lots of people—including many members of the Supreme Court—clearly 
think Congress made a dog‘s breakfast of § 1346.  But deciding whether 
legislation is well written (or good policy) isn‘t really the job of the Supreme Court 
(or the lower court judges, for that matter).  Maybe a statute limited to bribes and 
kickbacks would be better than the one Congress wrote.  But the policy choice 
belongs to Congress, even if you don‘t like the results.  Courts can‘t insert their 
policy preferences in the guise of ―interpretation.‖  And that‘s really what the 
majority did (just as they did in McNally).   
Frankly, I think the Court stepped over the separation of powers line.   
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: Nobody‘s saying that courts should rewrite statutes and 
define crimes to suit their policy preferences.  But the majority opinion in Skilling 
rests on the well-established principle of constitutional avoidance, which gives 
appropriate deference to Congress‘s legislative goals.20   
Otherwise, the Court would have had to throw the baby out with the bath 
water.  As the Court says, reading the statute more broadly ―would raise the due 
process concerns [of] the vagueness doctrine,‖ so ―[t]o preserve the statute without 
transgressing constitutional limitations,‖ the Court holds that ―§ 1346 criminalizes 
only the bribery-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law.‖21  You referred 
to Justice Scalia, but failed to note that, joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy, 
he wrote separately to argue that the statute is pervasively vague and can‘t be 
saved by interpretation.
22
  The majority had no choice but to cut back on the statute 
in order to save it.   
This is a perfectly appropriate exercise of judicial authority.   
                                                                                                                                                   
18  Brief for the United States at 44 n.5, Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (No. 
08-1394).   
19  Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2939 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
20  See, e.g., Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 
(2009) (―[I]t is a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of this Court‘s jurisdiction 
that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon 
which to dispose of the case.‖). 
21  Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2931. 
22  See id. at 2935 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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It doesn‘t frustrate Congress‘s purpose.  As Justice Ginsburg noted, the 
bribery and kickback cases made up the lion‘s share of the prosecutions before 
McNally, and if Congress had been ―[a]pprised that a broader reading of § 1346 
could render the statute impermissibly vague, Congress . . . would have drawn the 
honest services line, as we do now, at bribery and kickback schemes.‖23  She cites 
precedent, most notably Booker, in which the Court sought to determine what 
Congress would have intended in light of the Court‘s constitutional holding. 24   
 
PROF. KRYTIC: In the passage you quoted (and other parts of its opinion) the 
Court does seem to say that its interpretation is necessary to save the statute from 
invalidity, and, yes, three justices did write separately to say that the statute could 
not be saved.   
But note that Justice Ginsburg refers to the possibility that a broader reading 
could make the statute unconstitutionally vague.  In Booker, the Court expressly 
held that the Sentencing Reform Act violated the Sixth Amendment before the 
remedial majority channeled Congress to decide what remedy it would prefer.
25
  In 
Skilling, the Court skipped a key step.  Despite the fact that Congress reacted 
quickly and aggressively to the Court‘s opinion in McNally, adopting very broad 
language seeking to override it and reinstate the pre-McNally case law, the Court 
justified reading the statute narrowly because otherwise it could be 
unconstitutionally vague.  Because the Court never unambiguously determined that 
§ 1346 is impermissibly vague, Booker‘s not on point.   
There are lots of reasons not to do this kind of guessing about what Congress 
might have preferred, and the Court itself made those points in another case this 
term.  In United States v. Stevens, Justice Roberts (writing for eight members of 
the Court) declined to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 48 narrowly (declining to read in a 
requirement of extreme ―cruelty‖ despite the inclusion of that word in the statute) 
in order to save it.
26
  Justice Roberts emphasized that courts may impose a limiting 
construction to avoid serious constitutional doubts only if the statutory language is 
―readily susceptible‖ to that interpretation.  The courts may not ―‗rewrite‘‖ a 
statute to conform it to the Constitution, because ―doing so would constitute a 
‗serious invasion of the legislative domain,‘ and sharply diminish Congress‘s 
‗incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place.‘‖27 
Didn‘t Skilling do just that, rewriting the statute, invading the domain of 
Congress and diminishing its incentive to devise narrowly tailored laws?  If 
Congress wanted to write a statute making bribes and kickbacks crimes, it knew 
how to do so.  But that‘s not what it did in § 1346. 
                                                                                                                                                   
23  Id. at 2931 n.43. 
24  See id. (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005)).   
25  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 226, 226−27 (2004). 
26  130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591–92 (2010).   
27  Id. at 1592 (citations omitted).  
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Also, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, as the Court invokes it here, 
presumes that Congress did not want to risk the possibility that the statute (or some 
applications of it) would be invalid.  But Congress is not always so risk averse.  
Sometimes it wants to extend legislation as far as possible, testing the 
constitutional limits.  The avoidance doctrine unduly restricts such legislation.  
Where, as here, Congress chose broad language in response to a narrow 
interpretation of the statute in question, shouldn‘t the Court first determine whether 
the statute can be constitutionally applied more broadly?
28
  
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: You are missing the point.  The Court is clearly saying 
that without its narrow construction § 1346 would be void for vagueness.  Notice 
that not a single member of the Court disagreed on that point, not even Justice 
Stevens, who was such a strong defender of the honest services theory in McNally.  
The only disagreement was on the question of whether the statute could be saved 
even with such a narrowing construction. 
 
PROF. KRYTIC: I agree that the Court said its interpretation was necessary to 
save the statute from invalidity, and that three justices thought even that was not 
enough to save it.  
But can that really be right as a matter of doctrine?  Is the statute really vague 
on its face?  The Court has repeatedly said that facial challenges are rare and 
disfavored.
29
  As it acknowledged this term in the Stevens case, the Court has 
employed two standards to govern facial invalidation.  Facial challenges are 
successful only when (1) no set of facts exists under which the challenged 
provision would be valid, or (2) the ―statute lacks any ‗plainly legitimate 
sweep.‘‖30   
I don‘t think anyone can seriously contend that § 1346 meets either of these 
standards.  The point of the majority‘s opinion is that § 1346 has a ―solid core‖ of 
valid applications: the bribery and kickback cases.
31
  Further, this ―solid core‖ 
encompassing bribery and kickback schemes would seem to indicate § 1346‘s 
―plainly legitimate sweep.‖  That would explain why none of the circuits had 
invalidated § 1346 on its face, despite a great deal of academic and judicial teeth 
gnashing about vagueness. 
                                                                                                                                                   
28  See Bertrall L. Ross III, Against Constitutional Mainstreaming: Toward a Proper Judicial 
Role in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Sept. 17, 2009) (draft, on file with author). 
29  Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–51 (2008) (noting 
that facial challenges are disfavored because they ―often rest on speculation,‖ are contrary to judicial 
restraint, and ―threaten to short circuit the democratic process by . . . frustrat[ing] the intent of the 
elected representatives of the people.‖) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
30  United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740 n.7 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgments). 
31  Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2930 (2010). 
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In my view, the Court should have considered whether § 1346 was vague 
using the standard as-applied analysis, focusing on the facts of the three cases 
before it.  That‘s what Jeffrey Skilling‘s brief asked the Court to do.  He argued 
that (1) § 1346 should apply only when a defendant breached his duty of honest 
services in order to obtain private gain from the party to whom he owed honest 
services, or, in the alternative, (2) if the statute were not so limited it would be 
unconstitutionally vague, i.e., vague as applied to defendants who did not seek 
such gains, but not vague as to all defendants (or all who did not seek bribes or 
kickbacks).
32
 
Suppose the Court had considered in each of the three cases—Skilling, Black, 
and Weyhrauch—whether or not the defendants had fair notice that their conduct 
fell within the statute.  It‘s not clear that any of those defendants would have been 
able to succeed in the claim the statute was invalid as applied to them.   
But so what if the Court had held, for instance, that the statute was vague as 
applied to Jeffrey Skilling?  Let‘s assume the prosecutors really pushed the 
envelope in his case, and Skilling didn‘t have notice.  In other cases, the statute 
could still have been applied—properly—not only to defendants who took bribes 
and kickbacks, but also to lots of other defendants who had sufficient notice from 
the case law.
33
  Didn‘t the Court need to explain why the statute was not subject to 
as-applied analysis (if, as it appears, it was construing the statute on its face)? 
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: You‘ve put your finger on a soft spot in the Court‘s 
jurisprudence: it hasn‘t articulated a clear standard for when it will permit facial 
challenges and its decisions have been inconsistent.  The Morales decision, which 
held Chicago‘s gang loitering ordinance void for vagueness, is a good example. 34  
The Court didn‘t explicitly reject its earlier holding that facial challenges are 
proper only when no set of facts exists under which the challenged provision 
would be valid, but it didn‘t apply that standard, and it was unable to muster a 
majority for any approach.   
Despite repeated statements that facial challenges are rare and disfavored, 
many of the Court‘s constitutional decisions are effectively facial rulings with no 
                                                                                                                                                   
32  Brief for Petitioner at 48−57, Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010) (No.08-
1394). 
33  Generally the vagueness test is applied to a statute with its judicial gloss, i.e., as it has been 
authoritatively construed.  See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (citing inter 
alia, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355−56 (1983) and John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, 
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 207 (1985)). 
34  See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 51 (1999).   
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acknowledgement of that fact.
35
  That was true before John Roberts became Chief 
Justice, and it seems nothing‘s changed under his watch.36  
Maybe the Court is making a mistake in frequently analyzing statutes in the 
abstract rather than as applied; but, if so, that‘s a general problem, not one that‘s 
particular to the mail fraud statute.   
 
PROF. KRYTIC: So maybe we can‘t resolve the question whether the Court is 
right or wrong to do a de facto facial analysis in other cases.  But I would like you 
to think about how that plays out here, because it radically alters the results.  In 
other words, how can a statute be unconstitutionally vague on its face when the 
text plus the relevant case law provide adequate notice to many defendants of the 
prohibited conduct and accompanying penalties? 
I think most defendants—even those whose convictions don‘t rest on bribery 
or kickbacks—did have notice under § 1346.  Indeed, to rephrase a point Justice 
Stevens made in his powerful dissent in McNally, why is everybody so concerned 
about these kinds of defendants having notice, when they are highly sophisticated 
and much better informed than the average criminal defendant?  Bruce Weyhrauch 
was a lawyer on the legislative ethics committee.  Black and Skilling are 
exceptionally sophisticated businessmen who had the assistance of as many 
lawyers as money can buy.  All three knew (or had notice of) the breadth of the 
statute, and they could cross the T‘s and dot the I‘s in their own cases. 
I‘m especially interested in Weyhrauch, and I think he had ample notice that 
what he did violated § 1346.  The Ninth Circuit had repeatedly given § 1346 a 
broad reading that extended beyond bribes and kickbacks to the failure to disclose 
material information.  In a pre-McNally case the Ninth Circuit stated: 
 
A public official's non-disclosure of material information has also 
been held to satisfy the fraud element.  In United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 
641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. den., 424 U.S. 977 (1976), the failure of a 
public official to disclose his ownership interest in a corporation he 
recommended to the city he worked for was deemed fraudulent.  Most 
importantly for our purposes, the court held that the duty to disclose was 
incident to the defendant's duty as an employee of the city.  His employer 
had the right to negotiate for and award a contract with ―all the relevant 
facts‖ before it.37 
                                                                                                                                                   
35  David L. Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges and 
the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 690 (2008) (arguing that the Roberts Court‘s 
decisions ―adopt the language of the as-applied model even as their reasoning pursues the logic of the 
facial model‖).   
36  Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773, 800 (2009) (contending that the Roberts Court has picked up where the 
Rehnquist Court left off, ―asserting wide remedial discretion‖ and a ―strategic use of the facial/as-
applied distinction‖). 
37  United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).   
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Remember, Weyhrauch was a lawyer.  He had served several years in the 
Alaska House (in fact, he served on their ethics committee).  He was preparing to 
leave office when the state House took up legislation regarding the tax treatment of 
oil fields.  Shortly before the vote, Weyhrauch wrote to one of the main companies 
affected by the law, VECO, seeking legal work.  He neither recused himself from 
the legislative consideration of the oil field tax nor made any disclosure.  His 
blatant conflict of interest was a clear violation of Alaska law, which provides that 
a ―legislator may not . . . take or withhold official action or exert official influence 
that could substantially benefit or harm the financial interest of another person with 
whom the legislator is negotiating for employment.‖38  Before trial, the 
government indicated its intent to introduce evidence that Weyhrauch‘s failure to 
disclose violated the standards stated in state ethics publications and was contrary 
to both the practice in the legislature and the ethics training he had received.  
(Incidentally, the indictment also alleged that he agreed to take specific acts to 
assist VECO in return for employment.  But that might be harder to prove than the 
evidence of his own letter soliciting legal work, which he admittedly never 
disclosed.) 
Do you really think Weyhrauch lacked notice? 
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: Notice of what?  Weyhrauch apparently had notice that 
he was committing a violation of Alaska‘s ethics laws when he solicited legal 
employment from VECO.  But apparently that‘s not criminalized under state law.  
And actually that‘s not what the government alleged to be the violation of honest 
services.  Rather, the government focused on Weyhrauch‘s failure to disclose his 
conflict of interest.  As the district court pointed out, Alaska has no statutory duty 
to disclose.
39
 
The prosecutors were making a federal felony mountain out of a state 
molehill. 
There are lots of legal restrictions that aren‘t part of the criminal law.  There 
are other specialized regimes to deal with them, including rules for legislative 
behavior.  That was the Supreme Court‘s point in United States v. Sun-Diamond 
Growers, when it read the gratuities provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 201 narrowly, as a 
scalpel rather than a meat clever, leaving other bodies of law to define the finer 
points of ethical behavior in the federal legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches.
 40
 
                                                                                                                                                   
38  ALASKA STAT. § 24.60.030(e)(3) (2008). 
39  United States v. Kott, No. 3:07-cr-00056 JWS, 2007 WL 2572355, at *2–4, (D. Alaska 
Sept. 4, 2007) (noting that because the Alaska provision in question, AS 24.60.30(e)(3), ―does not 
include any requirement for the disclosure of . . . negotiations,‖ it would be ―inappropriate to imply 
[such] a duty,‖ and therefore Weyhrauch was not ―subject to a duty created by State law to disclose 
his dealings with VECO and its executives.‖). 
40  See 526 U.S. 398, 409−12 (1999).  
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Congressman Charles Rangel is facing charges that he violated a variety of 
legislative ethics rules, and the House is preparing to try him.
41
  If he is found 
guilty, he would be subject to a variety of sanctions imposed by Congress, not 
federal prosecutors.  Similarly, Alaska law provided for a legislative trial and a 
variety of sanctions for Weyhrauch‘s improper solicitation of legal work, up to and 
including expulsion.  Knowing you are facing such sanctions is not the same thing 
as knowing you have committed a federal felony. 
 
PROF. KRYTIC: But knowing you are committing a clear violation of your 
duties as a member of the Alaska State House does give you fair notice that you 
are violating your duty of honest services, and that falls squarely within the 
language (as well as the intent) of § 1346.  And failing to disclose such a clear 
conflict of interest should also be a violation of a uniform federal standard of 
honest services. 
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: You raised the separation of powers issue.  Don‘t you 
see how your interpretation infringes on the authority of both federal and state 
legislatures?  In the case of Congressman Rangel, Congress (not the Department of 
Justice) should be the judge of the severity of the sanctions it imposes if it finds 
violations of its own rules.  
The Weyhrauch case is even worse, because it not only puts the executive in 
charge of the sanctions for legislative behavior, but it‘s the federal government 
setting standards for good government on the part of state and local officials.  
That‘s a terrible idea.  
Maybe it‘s debatable whether these individuals had notice.  That‘s not really 
the point.  There‘s an inevitably fictive quality to the notice requirement, since few 
criminal defendants could or would research the text of the statute and the cases 
interpreting it.  But I don‘t think that matters here. 
The Supreme Court has consistently said that the due process/vagueness 
doctrine has two functions: notice to the individual and guidance to the police, 
prosecutors, and courts in enforcing a law.  Recent cases make it clear that the 
most important function of the requirement that laws not be excessively vague is to 
prevent arbitrary enforcement.
42
  
The real problem is that § 1346 provided virtually no guidance or limitation 
on the government‘s power to select individuals for prosecution.  That‘s an 
enormously serious problem for any criminal statute.  It‘s an especially serious 
problem in the case of § 1346, which covers the conduct of state and local 
                                                                                                                                                   
41  See Carol D. Leonnig & Paul Kane, Rep. Charles Rangel Broke Ethics Rules, House Panel 
Finds, WASH. POST, July 23, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/22/AR2010072204704_pf.html. 
42  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010); United States v. 
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
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government officials, implicating both federalism concerns and First Amendment 
values.   
I think the Court‘s conclusion that the statute was unconstitutionally vague 
flowed from its recognition that at the end of the day the statute placed no real 
constraints on federal prosecutors.  That led naturally to what was–properly–a 
facial analysis.  The Court finally pulled the plug on the new common law crimes 
created when prosecutors extended honest services to new situations.  Although the 
courts didn‘t endorse every new application, until Skilling there were no clear or 
coherent limits.  Our system is not supposed to work that way.  Congress—rather 
than federal prosecutors—is supposed to define what‘s a crime.   
 
PROF. KRYTIC: For the sake of argument, I‘ll grant you that the concept of 
honest services did not provide clear-cut guidance to prosecutors or judges in every 
situation.  But be realistic.  The mail fraud statute is hardly unique.  As Justice 
Stevens wrote in McNally: 
 
Statutes like the Sherman Act, the civil rights legislation, and the mail 
fraud statute were written in broad general language on the 
understanding that the courts would have wide latitude in construing 
them to achieve the remedial purposes that Congress had identified.  The 
wide open spaces in statutes such as these are most appropriately 
interpreted as implicit delegations of authority to the courts to fill in the 
gaps in the common-law tradition of case-by-case adjudication.
43
 
 
The lower courts had completed much of the work in filling in these gaps. 
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: First, don‘t forget that Justice Stevens was writing in 
dissent.  And in this case the lower court decisions were all over the map.  They 
left gaps big enough to drive a truck through.  One opinion from the Second 
Circuit‘s en banc decision in Rybicki identified circuit splits on the following key 
issues: 
 
• the mens rea required to commit mail fraud; 
• whether the defendant must have caused actual tangible harm; 
• the duty that must be breached; 
• the source of that duty; and 
• which body of laws governs the statute‘s meaning.44 
 
That‘s why Justice Scalia wrote separately in Skilling to argue that the statute is 
―hopelessly undefined‖ and provides ―no ascertainable standard of guilt.‖45 
                                                                                                                                                   
43  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 372–73 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
44  See United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 162–63 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).   
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In any event, the mail fraud act is nothing like the Sherman Act.  After all, we 
are talking about a statute that is employed to prosecute state and local government 
officials, with all of the issues that it raises: federalism, the danger of politically 
motivated use of prosecutorial discretion, and the potential to chill political 
activity.  
At best, the occasional interventions of federal prosecutions are likely to be 
arbitrary (and reminiscent of Justice Stewart‘s comment that the imposition of the 
death penalty was like being struck by lightning
46).  At worst, there‘s a real danger 
that improper motivations will influence the prosecution of state and local officials.  
These are high-profile, ―big game‖ cases that can make a lawyer‘s career.  So why 
not push the envelope a little?  And then there‘s the temptation to prosecute 
(persecute?) your political enemies and protect your friends.  Has that ever 
happened?  To take one recent example, a bipartisan group of forty-four former 
state attorneys general asked the House and Senate to investigate the prosecution 
of Alabama‘s former Democratic governor, Don Siegelman, who alleges that his 
prosecution for mail fraud and other offenses was politically motivated and 
orchestrated by Karl Rove and others.
47
  Some people think Otto Kerner was 
prosecuted by the Nixon administration because he had delivered the 1960 election 
to John Kennedy.
48
 
And then there‘s the prosecution of Wisconsin state employee Georgia 
Thompson, which may be the worst horror show of them all.  That poor soul was 
sent up the river on a § 1346 charge for what was at most a minor breach of the 
state‘s contracting procedures.49  Before the Seventh Circuit reversed her 
conviction (ordering her to be released the day of oral argument, without waiting 
for a formal opinion) she became a major focus of a hotly contested election.  
 
PROF. KRYTIC: You raise troubling questions, but even more troubling is the 
fact that Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion failed to even mention them despite the fact 
that these same concerns were articulated in both McNally and in Ginsburg‘s 
earlier opinion in Cleveland v. United States.
50
 
                                                                                                                                                   
45  Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2936−37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(citation omitted).    
46  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
47  See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 369, 385–87 (2009). 
48  See NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 159−60 (5th 
ed. 2010). 
49  See United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2007).  For a discussion of the 
Thompson case, see Beale, supra note 47, at 388–90. 
50  See Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24–25 (2000) (rejecting a broader reading of 
the mail fraud statute in order to avoid a ―sweeping expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction‖ that 
would significantly alter the ―federal-state balance in the prosecution of crimes‖) (internal quotations 
omitted); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1986) (―[r]ather than construe the statute in a 
manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting 
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Instead, the Court chose Jeffrey Skilling‘s case as the sole vehicle for its 
interpretation of § 1346.  It never suggested (even in its helpful footnote listing the 
issues Congress would have to consider if it wanted to override the decision
51
) that 
there were special federalism and political concerns in public sector cases.  The 
Court could have done so--some circuits did, explaining how the concept of honest 
services needed to be tailored in public and private sector cases.  
Why didn‘t the Court rely on or even discuss these federalism-based 
arguments?  Perhaps it‘s because the justices knew they had been rejected by 
Congress when it enacted § 1346.  I think you‘re applying an unreasonable and 
unrealistic standard.  Lots of federal criminal statutes are broadly written and 
difficult to interpret (thus raising issues of both notice and guidance to 
prosecutors).  The RICO statute
52
 is a great example.  It‘s long and complicated, 
with definitions of all of the key terms, such as pattern, enterprise, and so forth.  
All of this language, however, just raised a host of interpretative questions.  The 
Supreme Court has now decided seven cases interpreting different aspects of the 
RICO statute pertinent in criminal prosecutions.
53
  The circuit splits here rival (or 
exceed) those found under the mail and wire fraud statute, but only one member of 
the Court, Justice Scalia, has ever even suggested that the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague.  After characterizing the majority‘s explanation of the 
statutory term ―pattern‖ to be extraordinarily vague and about as helpful to the 
lower courts as ―‗life is a fountain,‘‖54 Justice Scalia concluded with this 
provocative statement, forecasting a future vagueness challenge to the law: ―That 
the highest Court in the land has been unable to derive from this statute anything 
more than today‘s meager guidance bodes ill for the day when that challenge is 
presented.‖55  The Court has never taken this issue up.  Apparently something 
Justice Scalia finds no more helpful than ―life is a fountain‖ is enough notice to 
defendants and guidance for prosecutors in RICO criminal cases, where the penalty 
is twenty years plus forfeiture.  Do you think ―honest services‖ is worse? 
Whether it‘s the application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the 
choice of on-its-face or as-applied analysis, or ultimate judgments about 
                                                                                                                                                   
standards of disclosure and good government for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited 
in scope to the protection of property rights.‖). 
51  See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 n.45 (2010). 
52  Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961−68 
(2006). 
53  See Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009) (association-in-fact enterprise); Cedric 
Kushner Promotions Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158 (2001) (person and enterprise); Salinas v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) (conspiracy); Nat‘l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) 
(enterprise); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (conduct); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 
492 U.S. 229 (1989) (pattern); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (enterprise).  Other 
cases interpreted aspects of the statute relevant only to civil litigation.  See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 
494 (2000); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex 
Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). 
54  See Nw. Bell Tel., 229 U.S. at 251−52 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
55  Id. at 256 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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vagueness, there‘s a double standard operating, and Skilling falls on the wrong side 
each time from the government‘s point of view.  It seems to me that the Court‘s 
manifest uneasiness or even visceral dislike of § 1346 led it to exaggerate the 
constitutional problems. 
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: I presume you are not seriously endorsing Justice 
Scalia‘s mocking ―life is a fountain‖ as a constitutionally adequate standard. 
Maybe the Court does treat § 1346 differently than RICO.  If so, there are at 
least two good reasons why it might want to do so.  First, prior violations of other 
criminal statutes are a necessary element of RICO, which criminalizes a pattern of 
racketeering crimes when other requirements are met.  This means that defendants 
have notice they are violating the predicate offenses, and prosecutors can‘t charge 
anyone unless they can prove these predicate violations. 
Second, the Department of Justice adopted very stringent internal guidelines 
for RICO cases shortly after the enactment of the statute.
56
  These detailed internal 
standards require advance approval from the Criminal Division before charges can 
be filed, thereby reducing the likelihood of arbitrary enforcement. 
And it‘s not a new insight that vagueness analysis is (and should be) highly 
context specific.  The Court was well aware that honest services prosecutions often 
target the behavior of state and local government officials, often conduct that does 
not violate any other law.  In Weyhrauch, for example, the court of appeals held 
that the defendant‘s conduct need not violate state law because the mail and wire 
fraud statutes themselves provide for a uniform national standard for honest 
services.  That gives me the willies, and it‘s a lot different from organized crime 
cases prosecuted under RICO or Sherman Act cases involving ―unreasonable‖ 
restraints on trade. 
 
PROF. KRYTIC: To borrow your own metaphor, it seems to me that amidst all 
this vagueness and due process bath water, you are forgetting exactly what baby 
we are trying to hang on to.  Congress enacted § 1346 to provide a basis for federal 
prosecutions.   
Under Skilling, the wire and mail fraud statutes reach only bribery and 
kickbacks.  But after McNally and before the enactment of § 1346, federal 
prosecutors had the authority to prosecute state and local officials for bribery under 
the Hobbs Act,
57
 and they could prosecute bribery, kickbacks, and illegal gratuities 
in cases involving federal officials and employees under other federal laws.
58
  
Congress obviously agreed with the Department of Justice that this was not 
enough, and it enacted § 1346 with its broad wording in order to cast a wider 
prosecutorial net.  Congress did not think it was a terrible idea to give federal 
                                                                                                                                                   
56  U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS‘ MANUAL § 9-111.300 (1997), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/110mcrm.htm.  
57  See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006).  
58  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).  
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prosecutors the ability to bring cases against corrupt state and local officials (or 
federal officials, like Congressman ―Dollar Bill‖ Jefferson, who was recently 
convicted of mail fraud along with other corruption offenses). 
And frankly, both the facts of the cases that made it to the Supreme Court and 
a glance at other cases in the news show just how right Congress was.   
In many state and local governments, corruption is rampant and endemic.  
Illinois is a familiar example.  The outrageous conduct of Governor Rod 
Blagojevich follows on the heels of his predecessors Governors George Ryan, Dan 
Walker, and Otto Kerner, all of whom were convicted of federal corruption under 
the mail fraud statute, as were scores of other state and local officials.   
Chicago is not the only sewer.  The corruption probe that gave rise to the 
Weyhrauch prosecution has already led to the conviction of at least six other state 
lawmakers–including the former speaker–as well as various private individuals.59  
After an op-ed criticizing the clout VECO had in the state legislature and listing 
the legislators who had taken the most VECO money, legislators began joking 
openly about being members of the ―Corrupt Bastards Club‖ (―CBC‖).60  The 
speaker‘s girlfriend testified under oath that she embroidered CBC on a hundred 
items for them.
61
  Cute. 
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: Occasional federal prosecutions just catch a few rats.  
They can‘t clean up a state or local sewer.  At the end of the day, the local 
authorities have to take responsibility for thorough housecleaning and structural 
changes.  Actually, the occasional federal prosecution may do more harm than 
good.  If people believe that these haphazard federal prosecutions solve the 
problem of governmental corruption, that may reduce pressure for the necessary 
changes and let state and local authorities off the hook. 
 
PROF. KRYTIC: I‘m not sure if I want to stick with the sewer imagery, but I‘ll 
give it a try.  It does make a difference to catch some of the biggest rats, such as 
governors and legislative leaders.  And it‘s very hard, if not impossible, for lower 
level state and local officials to do so.  Section 1346, as Congress wrote it, 
wouldn‘t solve all corruption problems, but it would serve as an important tool for 
federal prosecutions. 
                                                                                                                                                   
59  See generally David Hulen & Richard Mauer, The Alaska Political Corruption 
Investigation, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Sept. 24, 2009, 12:30 PM), 
http://community.adn.com/adn/node/112569 (describing jury convictions, guilty pleas, and ongoing 
investigations).  Additionally, U.S. Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska was convicted of seven felony 
counts related to allegations that he failed to report thousands of dollars in gifts and services on 
Senate disclosure forms.  See Neil A Lewis, Senator is Guilty Over His Failures to Disclose Gifts: 
Stevens Calls Verdict ‘Unjust’, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 
20527529.  Stevens‘ conviction was later set aside because of prosecutorial error. 
60  See Hulen & Mauer, supra note 59. 
61  See id.  See also Sean Cockerham & Lisa Demer, Kott was Different When He Drank, 
Witness Says, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 22, 2007, at A10, available at 2007 WLNR 18849457.  
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Of course federal prosecutions of state and local corruption raise federalism 
concerns.  But there are countervailing interests as well.  In addition to the inability 
of state and local actors to respond effectively when corruption is entrenched and 
pervasive, other federal interests may be implicated.  In the Weyhrauch case, the 
corruption affected critical legislation on oil field production.  Rod Blagojevich 
was prosecuted for trying to sell the nomination for the U.S. Senate seat vacated by 
Barack Obama.  Surely there are federal interests in those cases, and many others.  
It all boils down to this.  Think about how much the Court has narrowed the 
scope of the honest services provision: only bribery and kickbacks are prohibited, 
nothing else.  We don‘t know exactly how the courts will define bribes and 
kickbacks for this purpose, but it seems pretty clear that they require a prohibited 
financial transaction between the defendant and a third party.   
That seems totally inconsistent with what Congress was trying to do.  Recall 
that before the enactment of § 1346 the mail and wire fraud statutes both covered 
fraudulent schemes to obtain money or property.  The point of enacting § 1346 was 
to extend the statute to cases not involving schemes to obtain money or property 
but involving a breach of the duty of honest services.  So how does requiring a 
corrupt financial transaction make sense?   
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: Well, in our postmodern world, what does ―honest 
services‖ even mean?  A colleague suggested that perhaps the Court is concerned 
that there is no moral consensus at a societal level to underpin a broader definition 
of ―honest services.‖62  Maybe the corrupt financial transaction inherent in bribes 
and kickbacks is necessary to anchor the concept of ―fraud‖ and square it with 
modern notions of wrongdoing.    
But, postmodernism aside, ask yourself one of the positive political theory 
questions: how did the decision affect the Court‘s institutional interests?   
The Skilling decision was the product of compromise and the best practical 
way to both resolve the legal issue and preserve the Court‘s institutional 
legitimacy.  After all, the Justices knew the pundits, press, and politicians were all 
waiting for the honest services cases.  I‘m sure they remembered the storm kicked 
up earlier in the term by the decision in Citizens United, which held that 
corporations have a First Amendment right to unlimited, independent spending in 
election campaigns.
63
  That decision generated a lot of negative press, and 
President Obama criticized it in his State of the Union address.  Maybe the Court 
didn‘t want to see the headlines ―Supreme Court Holds Political Corruption Statute 
Unconstitutional.‖  That might also explain why the Court chose Skilling as its 
vehicle and didn‘t emphasize the special considerations raised by public sector 
cases.   
The Court‘s resolution of the case also had other benefits because it limited 
the number of defendants previously convicted under § 1346 who would be 
                                                                                                                                                   
62  I thank Joseph Kennedy for this insight.  
63  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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eligible for post-conviction relief.  So the decision limited both the work of the 
lower courts and the number of newspaper stories about bad guys being released 
because of the Supreme Court. 
 
PROF. KRYTIC: Well, if you want to look at Skilling that way, it‘s a real winner 
for the Court, which got all of the benefits you noted and also got as close as 
possible to its preferred policy result.  But the Court could have at least been 
candid about what it was doing.  It doesn‘t discuss those issues, and it stuck the 
honest services discussion at the end of a much longer discussion of jury prejudice.  
Why hide the ball?   
And how can you square Skilling with Justice Roberts‘ opinion earlier in the 
term in Stevens?  He wrote for eight members of the Court, and declined to read 
another statute narrowly because it would invade the policy-making province of 
Congress and not create the proper institutional incentives.  
Even if it was the right result from your perspective, can you reconcile 
Skilling with the rule of law values of transparency and consistency?
64
 
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: I‘m tired of negativity and pot shots at the Court.  You 
take issue with its interpretive mechanics, alleging that the majority uses a double 
standard in the application of various doctrines.  But suppose you were the new 
academic on the Supreme Court.  How would you have written the opinion in 
Skilling? 
 
PROF. KRYTIC: Why assume a single decision?  I think I would have written 
not only in Skilling, but also in Weyhrauch and Black.  That would allow me to 
consider the vagueness challenges in the context of specific legal arguments and 
factual situations.  And it would give me a chance to resolve the key issues raised 
in the lower courts.  
First, I‘d want the Court to answer the question on which it granted certiorari 
in Weyhrauch: is a violation of state law necessary?  Does it matter whether 
Weyhrauch‘s failure to disclose violated Alaska law?  Looking to state law 
provides an obvious way to give content to the term honest services.  They are the 
services that are required under state law.  If you are concerned about vagueness, 
that‘s a big help.  And it links to the language of the statute, because it‘s a 
definition of the ―services‖ in question (and perhaps also what ―honest‖ means in a 
particular context).  But it means that the standard will vary from state to state, and 
some of the worst problems may be in states with the weakest regulations. 
Second, what about harm?  The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Black to 
decide the question whether § 1346 applies to the conduct of a private individual 
                                                                                                                                                   
64  For an excellent discussion of the tension between judicial statesmanship (approaching 
individual cases in a manner that facilitates the capacity of the legal system to legitimate itself) and 
other rule-of-law values of consistency and transparency, see Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial 
Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959 (2008). 
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whose alleged ―scheme to defraud‖ did not contemplate economic or other 
property harm to the private party to whom honest services were owed.  Should it 
matter if the defendant contemplated harm to the party to whom he owed a duty 
(and, if so, what kind of harm counts)?  Some courts thought this was an essential 
attribute of ―fraud,‖ while others thought that depriving the victim of honest 
services was, per se, a form of fraud under § 1346.  As I said a moment ago, I think 
that‘s a strong argument.  But it does substantially expand the scope of criminal 
liability, and the issue plays out differently in public and private sector cases. 
Incidentally, this issue highlights an interesting facet of the Court‘s decision 
in Skilling, which is that it does not necessarily bring the most serious or important 
cases within § 1346.  Bribes and kickbacks may or may not be particularly 
harmful.  It depends on a variety of factors, including the size of the bribe or 
kickback and the effect of the payments.  On the other hand, some self-dealing 
and/or other undisclosed conflicts of interest could have a much greater impact 
than a small bribe or kickback.  So a focus on harm may justify extending § 1346 
beyond bribes and kickbacks. 
That leads to my third point.  This is a ―fraud‖ statute, and fraud has 
traditionally included failure to disclose material information under certain 
circumstances.  But when?  There‘s a strong argument that the application of this 
doctrine necessarily requires an interpretation that focuses on both the context in 
general and the relationship between the parties.  Different fiduciaries have 
traditionally had different duties.  But what factors should count?  Sadly, the Court 
did not even begin to explore these issues.
65
 
Fourth, fraud cases also traditionally focus on the requirement of fraudulent 
intent.  If one focuses on the intent to deceive, cases like Skilling and Black really 
come into focus.  For example, there‘s no question that Jeffrey Skilling was 
engaged in elaborate attempts to mislead investors about Enron‘s financial well-
being.  Similarly, Conrad Black clearly sought to disguise the true nature of 
payments totaling $5.5 million ostensibly in return for his agreement not to 
compete with newspapers owned by a corporation he controlled.
66
  Exactly what is 
the relevant definition of fraudulent intent?  Does it mean intent to deceive on 
some material matter?  Or, as Jeffrey Skilling argued, does it mean intent to obtain 
private gain by deceptive and dishonest means? 
                                                                                                                                                   
65  See Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 4 DUKE J. CONST‘L LAW & PUB. POL. 
(forthcoming 2010) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656350.  
66  See United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2008).  The corporation owned only 
one very small community newspaper, and Black subsequently admitted that the payments were 
management fees labeled as non-compete fees to avoid Canadian taxes.  Id.  A report commissioned 
by the board of one of the companies found that the management and non-compete fees to Black and 
his cronies had been ―grossly excessive.‖  REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF HOLLINGER INTERNATIONAL INC. 15 (Aug. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/868512/000095012304010413/y01437exv99w2.htm. They personally 
collected 95.2% of the corporation‘s adjusted net income. 
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And, finally, I‘d like to think about whether there should be some distinctions 
between public and private sector cases, either in terms of the nature of the 
fiduciary duties, the requirement of a state law violation, or the potential for 
monetary gain or harm.  I think the statute might work better if it were bifurcated, 
but Congress didn‘t write it that way.  So is there any room for judicial 
distinctions? 
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: Don‘t you see that all these unanswered questions 
validate the holding of the majority in Skilling?  If you don‘t cut mail fraud back 
radically, it‘s hopelessly vague.  The only alternative would be agreeing with 
Justice Scalia that § 1346 is so pervasively vague it can‘t be saved by 
interpretation. 
 
PROF. KRYTIC: All these questions prove is that the mail and wire fraud 
statutes, augmented by § 1346, do require interpretation.  Many issues will arise as 
they are applied to a limitless range of factual scenarios.  That‘s always been the 
nature of both fraudulent activity and the crime of fraud.  But the courts should 
interpret the statute, not rewrite it. 
I‘d turn the question around: do you really want to say that the concept of 
fraud is unconstitutionally vague? 
 
PROF COURTRIGHT: Don‘t be ridiculous.  The sky is not falling.  The 
consequences of the Skilling decision will largely be positive.  Public and private 
actors now have greater notice of what conduct could make them subject to the 
honest services provision and, correspondingly, federal prosecutors and lower 
courts have more guidance.   
The ball is now back in the court (so to speak) of the Justice Department and 
Congress.  If we need to criminalize conflicts of interest or other forms of 
deceptive or dishonest conduct, Skilling provides Congress with the proper 
incentive to enact precise legislation. 
 
PROF. KRYTIC: I completely disagree.  The Skilling decision encroached on the 
policy-making authority of the Department of Justice and Congress, though they 
may be unable or unwilling to respond effectively.  A decision striking down the 
statute was likely to provoke a strong response from the Department of Justice and 
Congress, something akin to the passage of § 1346 after McNally.  But passing a 
response to Skilling won‘t be as high a priority for the Justice Department.  And I 
am sure the Department noticed that little shot across their bow in Skilling‘s 
footnote 45, laying out all of the issues Congress would need to resolve if it wants 
to extend the statute. 
 
PROF. COURTRIGHT: Even if that‘s true and your criticisms of the decision 
have merit, so what?  In the end, what‘s the real problem, substantively, with 
limiting honest services to bribes and kickbacks?  Given all the practical benefits 
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of the Skilling decision, aren‘t any flaws in the Court‘s approach merely harmless 
error?  
 
PROF. KRYTIC: I don‘t think it is harmless error, but we can‘t be sure exactly 
how big the change will be until we see how the lower courts respond.  For 
instance, the lower courts have some work to do in construing bribery and 
kickbacks for purposes of § 1346 since the Court pulled those terms more or less 
out of thin air (rather than from the extensive body of case law under § 1346).  
(Does that make this new definition unconstitutionally vague?  Overlooking for the 
moment that resolving lower court confusion was one of the Court‘s primary 
objectives in granting certiorari, apparently not.)   
There might be unanticipated consequences of the Court‘s interpretation of § 
1346.  For example, it might lead prosecutors to charge health care ―kickbacks‖ 
(now punishable by a maximum of five years imprisonment) as mail or wire fraud, 
which carry a much higher maximum penalty and also allow the government to 
label the conduct with the powerful label of ―fraud.‖67 
Other impacts may be subtle things we can‘t easily document.  A friend who 
worked with senior corporate executives made an interesting point about the much-
criticized provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
68
  He said some executives 
commented that before Sarbanes-Oxley they never really felt they needed to read 
their corporate documents closely to see if they were accurate.  Now they do.
69
  We 
need more such incentives for careful, scrupulous behavior.   
How much clarity do we want in statutes that are aimed at sophisticated, 
deliberate behavior designed to skirt or evade laws and regulations designed to 
protect the public?  Broad flexible statutes change the incentives for the ―smartest 
guys in the room‖ who would otherwise set out to find the loopholes that would let 
them deceive groups such as shareholders or the general public in order to line 
their own pockets.
70
  Don‘t the Skilling and Black facts fit this pattern?   
In limiting § 1346 to bribes and kickbacks, has the Supreme Court rendered 
what was once a powerful prosecutorial tool irrelevant?   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
67  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) defines the crime of illegal remuneration, including 
―kickbacks,‖ and makes it punishable by five years imprisonment and a fine of not more than 
$25,000.  In contrast, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1343 mail and wire fraud are punishable by 
imprisonment for up to twenty years in cases not affecting a financial institution or benefits paid in 
connection with a presidentially declared major disaster.  I thank Joan Krause for drawing this point 
to my attention. 
68  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).  
69  I thank Lawrence Baxter for this insight. 
70  See Sam W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1563–64 (2008).  
This can, of course, be seen as an exemplification of the rules versus standards debate.  See, e.g., 
MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15–63 (1987); Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
This fictional debate explores two largely distinct kinds of issues raised by the 
Court‘s opinion in Skilling.  Criminal law scholars expected the Court to address 
some of the central issues in federal criminal law: (1) the federalism issues raised 
by the prosecution of state and local government officials; (2) the potential for 
overlap and conflict between broad conceptions of mail fraud and other federal and 
state regulatory systems; (3) the proper boundaries of criminal law and the problem 
of overcriminalization; and (4) the largely unregulated prosecutorial discretion that 
results from broadly drafted criminal statutes.  There are no easy answers to these 
questions, and it was not reasonable to expect that the Court could resolve them all 
in Skilling, Black, and Weyhrauch.  What was surprising, however, was the Court‘s 
failure to engage or even acknowledge these issues, except to the extent they were 
necessarily part of its assumption that, absent a limiting interpretation, § 1346 
would have been unconstitutionally vague. 
Precisely because the Court did not engage these criminal justice concerns, 
the Skilling opinion prompted the debate‘s exploration of other issues that are less 
often the focus of criminal law scholarship: the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance, the standards governing facial versus as-applied challenges, the proper 
methodology for interpreting statutes, and institutional concerns regarding the 
federal judiciary and its relationship to the other branches of government.  These 
issues have generally been seen as the province of scholars specializing in 
constitutional law, federal courts, legislation, and public choice theory.   
Skilling suggests that criminal law scholars should broaden their agenda to 
encompass these issues.  The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is a good 
example.  Unlike the rule of lenity,
71
 the doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
seems to have no special relevance to criminal justice policy.  Skilling 
demonstrates, however, that the avoidance doctrine has the potential to ratchet 
back both the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction and the reach of individual 
federal criminal statutes.  A consistent and robust application of the avoidance 
doctrine could profoundly impact the federal criminal system.  The same may be 
true for other rules governing statutory analysis, and for the availability of on-its-
face versus as-applied challenges.  Accordingly, these issues should be a concern 
of criminal justice scholars as well as scholars in the other fields mentioned above. 
But as noted in my fictional debate, the Supreme Court has not employed the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance or the standards for allowing a facial challenge 
consistently in criminal cases.
72
  Examining the Supreme Court‘s application of 
                                                                                                                                                   
71  The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the 
defendants subjected to them.  For a general discussion of the rule, see Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2420 (2006).  For recent decisions of the Supreme Court discussing the rule, see 
United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025−31 (2008) and Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 
124, 135−36 (2008). 
72  See supra text accompanying notes 30 and 34 (discussing Stevens and Morales); 
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).  
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these doctrines in criminal cases could illuminate both the doctrines themselves 
and their implications for the federal criminal justice system.  Scholarship of this 
nature might address a variety of questions.  In the criminal justice context, what 
factors seem to influence the application of these doctrines?  Is the Court 
influenced, sub silentio, by certain criminal justice policy concerns?  Have the 
doctrines been employed strategically to advance certain policy objectives, and, if 
so, what objectives?  And how do the criminal cases compare to other distinct 
groups of cases, such as those concerning regulatory statutes or voting rights? 
Maybe that should be the next debate. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Other decisions in which the Court did not apply the avoidance doctrine as a rationale for a narrowing 
statutory interpretation include Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010) 
(interpreting the ―material support‖ for terrorism statute); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 
(2008) (interpreting the child pornography statute); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) 
(interpreting the federal program bribery statute). 
